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The U.S. Response to the 2016 Russian Election 
Meddling and the Evolving National Strategic 
Thought in Cyberspace
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Dóra DÉVAI2
Due to the heightened political sensitivity caused by the recently held U.S. midterm 
elections and the frenzied media concentration on the 2016 election meddling, 
hacking and leaks have been in the focus of public discussions ever since. In order 
to better comprehend the appraisal of the U.S. political leadership back in 2016 
and early in 2017, this article contextualizes the events and the response measures 
in the wider cybersecurity position of the U.S. Tracking down the development 
of the U.S. political and military approach to cyber threats,3 we came to 
the conclusion that the U.S. is lacking a working cybersecurity policy largely 
because its perception of cyber threats is self-centred and still deeply rooted in 
the strategic thinking of nuclear or traditional military attacks. Even if the same 
strategic principles are valid in cyberspace, cyberattacks, single, systemic or part 
of a broader influence operation, they play out according to a set of completely 
different dynamics than kinetic attacks. The true strategic lesson of the recent 
election meddling is that Russia has been, and most probably will be, able to seize 
the momentum and masterfully exploit those inherent deficiencies. Consequently, 
cyberspace as a strategic environment necessitates the careful analysis of 
the strategic thinking of the potential adverse nation.
Keywords: U.S. cybersecurity policy, strategic culture, influence operations, 
cyber deterrence
1 This is the first part of a series of three articles. The second part gives a strategic insight into the national 
response policy options to substantial cyberattacks in the U.S. The third part of the series continues 
the discussion with a concise overview of the Russian strategic context of influence operations.
2 Ph.D. student, National University of Public Service, Doctoral School of Military Engineering; Devai.Dora@
uni-nke.hu; ORCID ID: 0000-0003-1024-4474
3 The article refers back to the regulatory background at its given state back at the time during the 2016 mid-
term elections.
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Introduction
“Barack Obama and Joe Biden will ensure that his administration develops a Cyber 
Security Strategy that ensures that we have the ability to identify our attackers and a plan 
for how to respond that will be measured but effective” read the 2008 election site of then 
candidate Barack Obama. [1] The securitization and strategizing of cyberattacks go back 
to at least as early as the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, there is a growing evidence 
that nation states have used cyberspace for intelligence and military purposes since 
the first versions of computers appeared.4 In the meantime, the dependence of the nation 
states on the flawless operation of the internet and information technology in general 
has skyrocketed. In realization of this fact, cyberspace has been publicly recognized as 
an operational domain, and its strategic utility meaning, the systematic employment of 
cyberattacks to pursue national political purposes, has been gaining ground since at least 
the attack against Estonia in 2007. Moreover, there is also a competition between states 
seeking to find ways to gain strategic advantage through cyberspace that is to use cyber 
intrusions and cyberattacks in order to influence the “overall relative power relationship of 
opponents that enables one nation or group of nations effectively to control the course of 
a military or political situation”. [2: 522] This broadening of the activities of nation states 
in cyberspace necessitates a novel, more systematic approach beyond military planning, 
more akin to traditional statecraft and strategic art. Consequently, both in the emerging 
academic strategic literature and in the evolving politico-strategic thinking of the nation 
states, the nature of cyberspace and its strategic implications are being widely appraised.
The Evolving Concept of Cyberspace as a Strategic Environment
Cyberspace as a strategic environment has distinctive features with still plenty of known 
and unknown unknowns. [3] It is to a large extent a hidden landscape both literally, due to 
the attribution challenge and the technical complexities, and in terms of strategic thinking, 
as a result of the fast-paced development of the technology and the nascent strategic 
thought trailing behind it, but also to the particularly strong secrecy surrounding the cyber 
activities of the nation states. As national cyber strategies are gradually formulated and 
simultaneously tested also in real life, these tests and incidents yield pragmatic lessons 
on the nature and the limitations of distinctive national approaches. The recent events of 
Russian influence operations during the U.S. presidential elections served as the latest 
reminder of how distinctive this comprehension can be.5 One aim of this study series is to 
examine if the traditions of national strategic thinking.
4 See, for example: KHALILZAD, Z., WHITE, J. P., MARSHALL, A. W.: Strategic Appraisal. The Changing 
Role of Information in Warfare. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1999. Also: HUNT, E.: U.S. Government 
Computer Penetration Programs and the Implications for Cyberwar. IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 
34 3 (2012), 4–21. NYE, J. S. Jr.: Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security? In. Strategic Studies Quarterly. 
Washington, D.C.: Air University Press, 2011.
5 As for the identity and purpose of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), hackers and leakers, there still 
are some dissenting voices. Based on the joint U.S. intelligence community reports published in December 
2016 and January 2017, the author of this article adopts these as proven facts.
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In addition, scholars can also have more insight into how cyberspace or the information 
environment is gaining strategic sense, and how it affects the way international conflicts and 
rivalry take place. At the heart of these strategic discussions, one of the questions splitting 
Western academic strategists is: to what extent generic strategic theory—and its major 
concepts like deterrence—is applicable in cyberspace. According to, for example, Colin S. 
Gray a most renowned British classic strategic theorist, the nature of political power and 
rivalry remains the same, thus the traditional premises of strategic theory are also applicable 
in cyberspace. [3]
In light of these tendencies, despite its technological superiority, the U.S. susceptibility 
and inept response to the 2016 Russian influence operations constitutes an excellent case 
study of how nation states seek to integrate cyberspace into their strategic thought. In other 
words, how they intend to maximize their chances to exploit the opportunities in cyberspace in 
order to realize their national interests; how they perceive threats coming through cyberspace 
and how they try to neutralize or eliminate them; and also how these distinctive approaches 
play out against each other. This time, Russia did manage to take the most advanced cyber 
nation off guard and exert some influence over the integrity of its core democratic political 
institution. The assumption of this article is that the Russian strategists recognized and 
exploited the opportunity offered by the inherent technical determinants of cyberspace, as 
well as the strategic, legal and institutional and doctrinal incoherence and imbalances of 
the U.S. thinking.
Moreover, although the operationalization of (cyber) informational power in Russian 
strategic thinking is indeed fundamentally different from the Western approach, the recent 
developments also prove the long-running knowledge in strategic communities that Russian 
strategists are “good Clausewitzians” to be true also in cyberspace. As James J. Wirtz from 
the Naval Postgraduate School puts it, they understand that war is a political act, hence “quick 
to think through the links between technol ogy, military operations, strategy, and ultimately 
political outcomes, despite their lack of technological dexterity”. [4: 32] Meanwhile, the U.S. 
seems to carry on the same deficiency as in its kinetic strategic thought. According to a U.S. 
expert’s recent comment, “America’s primary weakness is not in its lack of economic or 
military power, but in a failure to formulate strategy and, frankly, poorly informed decision-
making, even when faced with a peer nuclear power. Military capability in and of itself will 
not fix these cardinal weaknesses in judgment, nor make up for a lack of vision and political 
will to see hard choices through”. [5]
Several guidebooks and manuals have been published recently on national cybersecurity 
strategy models. In these, crisis management and contingency planning, information 
assurance, and resiliency are central organizing elements. In this article the focus is different. 
We argue that the election-time influence operation revealed that there should be an urgent 
shift in national cyber security thinking informed by the logic of general strategic thinking. 
Through the example of the American response measures, our aim is to ascertain some 
of the new strategic challenges in cyberspace including a powerful and assertive adverse 
nation state. To this end, we contextualize the events in terms of the relevant American and 
Russian strategic documents and policy statements. According to the logic of strategic theory, 
national capabilities, cyber or other, have a relative value and must be appraised in relational 
terms. Examining the events through a strategic lens will yield some insight into first, how 
historically distinctive strategic cultures determine cybersecurity strategy formation, second, 
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how surfacing strategies materialize in practice, and finally, how the resulting action–reaction 
cycle plays out in cyberspace.
Accordingly, first we apply the basic concepts of strategic theory to cyberspace and 
cybersecurity. The objective here is to identify the strategic dilemmas of the U.S. response 
and more broadly, the strategic planning approach in its national cybersecurity efforts. Then, 
the study will trace back the roots and the strategic repercussions of the idea of strategic 
cyberattacks in the U.S. In Part 2, the U.S. cybersecurity thinking is examined in terms of 
deterrence theory and practice. In the kinetic realm, conventional military and strategic 
nuclear power are pivotal means of deterrence. As the case study in this article reveals, in 
cyberspace, though it proves to be a much more daunting task, some experts and practitioners 
even doubt if this is possible at all. Closely related to deterrence, the Russian hacking case 
adds some lessons on the strategic importance of attribution, as well. To conclude, we sum 
up the strategic lessons of this case study and make some recommendations accordingly. An 
upcoming third part of this article intends to highlight in the same vein the major differences 
concerning U.S. and Russian threat perception in their respective approaches to the strategic 
use of cyberspace.
Baseline Definitions
Cyber related concepts are still fluid in national security thinking. Even within one policy 
area, like the military or homeland security, there is a multitude of strategic documents 
often with inconsistent terminology, which well reflects the fundamental stumbling block 
of U.S. strategy development in cyber issues. There is a general effort to centralization and 
unification within each policy area, as well as at the highest overall national security level. 
Cyber threats pose security threats of a new character that demand strategic level adaptation, 
but the nature of national security dynamics, however, have not changed because nation 
states are pursuing strategic goals in cyberspace, just like in other domains. In this study, 
we will use working definitions that are closest to strategic theory.
Cyberspace
Cyberspace as a working concept here is understood as part of the overall strategic 
environment in which nation states define their ways, ends, and means. In order to better 
understand the strategic value of cyberspace, the physical, logical and socio-political 
components have to be considered as an integrated whole. In the evolving strategic studies of 
cyberspace, the most common model derives from the fusion of a simplified Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model that characterizes and standardizes the communication 
functions of a telecommunication or computing system, and a cognitive layer. In 2007, 
Martin Libicki divided cyberspace into three layers: physical, syntactic and semantic 
layer. [7] The fourth cognitive or politico-strategic layer encompasses all the actors and their 
different motivations interests and strategies—military, civilian, commercial individuals, 
organizations and nation states—who use cyberspace to achieve their goals.
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The notion of cyberspace in the U.S. strategic and national security documents has 
underwent an unsynchronized evolution. Militarily, initially it only appeared publicly in 
Information Operations documents and it was limited to the technical that is the physical 
and the syntactic layers. In addition, cyberspace originally constituted only a subfield of 
the information environment and cyber offensive operations constituted one element of 
military information support operations. However, it has gradually acquired an independent 
status as a separate domain of operations alongside land, sea, air and space. The first 
independent doctrine on cyberspace appeared in 2006 entitled The National Military Strategy 
for Cyberspace that treated cyberspace only in terms of its physical components used by 
the military to implement military operations
In the wider national security context, cyberspace has also evolved gradually but starting 
out of a purely infrastructural approach. The first seminal occurrences of the vulnerabilities 
and threats was the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in 1997. Ever 
since then, the national security thinking is centred on the cyber security or the physical 
safety of the infrastructures.6
Cyberattack
As of today, in the U.S. there is no official legal definition of a cyberattack. The evolution 
of the concept of cyberattack in different U.S. strategic documents will be discussed in 
detail later on. For the purpose of this study, a generic definition of a cyberattack is used 
taken from one of the most often cited academic sources, the National Research Council’s 
report entitled Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use 
of Cyberattack Capabilities. According to the report, a cyberattack “refers to deliberate 
actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or 
the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks”. [6: 1] 
This approach is in line with the official U.S. position that does not recognize unauthorized 
access to computers, or in other words espionage in itself as an attack.7
Cybersecurity Strategy
The strategic implications of cyber conflict reach beyond and across the military, intelligence 
and economic sectors—extending into the high-policy realm of diplomacy and statecraft. 
Cyberspace at nation-state level is governed by “economic laws of rival resources” and 
“laws of sovereign jurisdiction and control”. [8: 3] Attacks from the physical and semantic 
layers impact power at the politico-strategic level, while control at the political layer have 
effects at the other two. Therefore, cybersecurity strategy must follow the logic of national 
security strategy: “The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, 
6 For example, in 2009 the National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) defines cyberspace: “as the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.” [21]
7 The report designates such penetrations as exploitation.
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social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance 
to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or 
circumstances.” [9: 1]
Strategic Planning in Cyberspace
Generic strategic theory is the academic literature on how to think about national (security) 
strategies. Consequently, in this study the strategy formulation model of the U.S. Army 
War College will be used as an analytical framework to evaluate the evolving U.S. strategic 
thought and security policy in cyberspace. [9]
In the following section, the most important premises of strategic theory are outlined. 
Strategic theory applies a holistic and integrative approach. Formulating strategy at the highest 
levels of the state, that is at grand strategic or the national security level is: “a process that 
seeks to apply a degree of rationality and linearity to circumstances that may or may not be 
either. Strategy accomplishes this by expressing its logic in rational, linear terms—ends, 
ways, and means.” [9: 1]
Strategic planning has essential building blocks and an established, coherent procedure. 
If any of these is missing or not appropriately presented, the national cybersecurity process 
will stumble:
“From an accurate analysis of the strategic environment, the strategist determines 
the threats to and opportunities for the advancement or protection of these interests. From 
policy, the strategist receives the political leadership’s vision, guidance, and priorities 
of effort in regard to interests. Thus, in constructing a valid strategy, the strategist is 
bounded by the nature of the strategic environment, the dictates of policy, and the logic of 
strategy.” [9: 73]
Policy dominates strategy by the articulation of the end state and its guidance regarding 
resources, limitations on actions, or similar considerations. “Strategy cannot be formulated 
in a policy or intellectual vacuum.” [9: 9] Strategy is hierarchical. The political leadership 
ensures and maintains its control and influence over the instruments of power through 
the hierarchical nature of state strategy. Clarity and precision are the essentials of a strategy 
to provide strategic purpose and unity of direction.
“The role of the strategist is to exercise influence over the volatility, manage the uncertainty, 
simplify the complexity, and resolve the ambiguity, all in terms favourable to the interests of 
the state and in compliance with policy guidance.” [9: 18]
The strategic environment has a predominant role in strategy. In order to best serve 
purposes of a national strategy at the highest-level cyberspace must be considered in its 
broadest sense. In strategic theory the strategic environment incorporates: “[t]he internal and 
external context, conditions, relationships, trends, issues, threats, opportunities, interactions, 
and effects that influence the success of the state in relation to the physical world, other 
states and actors, chance, and the possible futures. […] the role of the strategist is ultimately 
to advocate actions that will lead to desirable outcomes while avoiding undesirable ones, 
the strategist must understand the nature of the environment in order to exert influence 
within it”. Strategy is subordinate to the nature of the environment. Strategy must identify 
an appropriate balance among the objectives sought, the methods to pursue the objectives, 
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and the resources available within the particular strategic environment. Strategy must be 
consistent with the nature of the strategic environment. [9: 17–18; 66]
“The true purpose of strategy is to create favourable effects in support of policy goals 
for the advancement or protection of national interests. Strategic effects are the impact 
that the accomplishment of strategic objectives has on the environment. Effect flows from 
strategic performance—the synergy of the objective(s) achieved, the concept(s) employed, 
and the resources used.” [9: 45]
“In strategy formulation, getting the objectives (ends) right matters most! Objectives are 
the true focus of strategy formulation and, if not properly selected and articulated, a proposed 
strategy is fundamentally flawed and cannot be effective.” [9: 49]
Strategy rests upon the ends, ways and means structure. “Objectives (ends) explain 
‘what’ is to be accomplished. Strategic concepts (ways) answer the big question of ‘how’ 
the objectives are to be accomplished by the employment of the instruments of power. They 
link resources to the objectives by addressing who does what, where, when, how, and why, 
with the answers to which explaining ‘how’ an objective will be achieved. […] Resources 
(means) in strategy formulation set the boundaries for the types and levels of support 
modalities that will be made available for pursuing concepts of the strategy. In strategy, 
resources can be tangible or intangible.” [9: 69]
The notion of power is a central idea in political science and international relations, 
military studies and strategic theory, but it has a distinctive meaning in all three. In political 
science the concept of power has gone through many transformations since pre-WWII times. 
In essence, it is about influence and control over resources, or directly or indirectly over 
another party or more broadly over the circumstances of the given situation. As Lawrence 
Freedman eloquently determines strategy focuses on interplay and balance between 
the strategic environment, the desired end state and the choice of the right instruments and 
elements of power:
“The realm of strategy is one of bargaining and persuasion as well as threats and pressure, 
psychological as well as physical effects, and words as well as deeds. This is why strategy is 
the central political art. It is about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of 
power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.” [10: 12]
In U.S. military theory, by contrast, cyber power is equivalent to military capabilities 
and power projection in a given natural domain like air, sea or land, or in case of cyber, 
the cyber domain. Strategic theory combines the political and military understanding of 
power: elements (capabilities) and instruments of national power that are employed in order 
to exercise control over the strategic environment to achieve the desired end state.
“Capabilities refer to the set of resources and assets the state possesses that increase 
its potential (capacity) to carry out its aims. In conventional warfare terms, capabilities 
are measured by factors like the country’s population, industrial capacity, technological 
advancement, or the size of its military forces. In cyberspace, capabilities refer to the state’s 
resources and assets that help it achieve its goals in cyberspace such as numbers of hackers, 
the level of expertise in computer science, and malware sophistication.” [11] Power is 
measured by the actual influence exerted or the outcomes brought about. The strategic 
purpose of cyber power is to achieve policy objectives.
Strategic theory is related to but different from strategic culture as a discipline. Nevertheless, 
the theory acknowledges that distinctive national history, culture and worldview all play an 
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important role in strategy formulation. For example, “Western thinking is permeated with 
the binary logic inherent to Western scientific thought. Binary logic is rooted in Aristotle’s 
philosophical law that something is either A or ‘not A.’ It cannot be A and ‘not A.’ It is either 
true or false. Thus in Western science, math, logic, and much of culture, we assume a world 
of blacks and whites that does not change—this is bivalent logic—two-valuedness”. [9: 43]
The 2016 U.S. Elections and the Russian Influence Operations
The events during the latest U.S. presidential elections is illustrative of the technical, 
institutional and strategic cultural aspects that might hinder the development of an effective 
cybersecurity strategy. Detailed analysis of all the U.S. cybersecurity documents is beyond 
the scope of this study. Instead, in Table 1 the relevant U.S. public statements, marked 
in bold italics against shaded background, are enlisted in chronological order along with 
the timeline of the election meddling events. This format enables a quick overview of 
both the flow events and how they impact the publication of policy statements that try to 
strategize response mechanisms to a cyberattack. It also helps to elucidate the fact that 
cyber security strategic planning is at an early phase of progress, still leaving several major 
strategic gaps unresolved.
Table 1. A chronology of key events and U.S. strategic documents and policy statements. 
[Edited by the author.]
May 2011 White House: International Strategy for Cyberspace
July 2011 DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace
September 2012 DoD: International Law in Cyberspace. Harold Hongju Koh, DOS legal adviser’s statement
2013 DoD Defense Science Board Study: Resilient Military Systems 
2013 White House, Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21 entitled Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience
2013 Cyberspace Operations, Joint Publication 3–12(R)
1 April 2015 White House: Executive Order 1396 “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons 
Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities”
April 2015 DoD: The National Military Strategy of the United States of America
15 April 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy
5 June 2015 DoD Cyber Command: The Commander’s Vision and Guidance for U.S. Cyber 
Command: Beyond the Build. Delivering Outcomes through Cyberspace
12 June 2015 Law of War Manual—United States Department of Defense
18 December 
2015 White House Report to Congress on Cybersecurity Deterrence
March 2016 Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy 
Hacking Incidents Start to Appear in Public
14 June 2016 
The Washington Post revealed that “Russian government hackers” had penetrated 
the computer network of the Democratic National Committee.
Crowdstrike technical report published on DNC hacks.
15 June 2016 Guccifer 2.0 crops up in a BlogSpot.
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20 June 2016 Mandiant and Fidelis confirmed Crowdstrike’s initial findings that Russian intelligence 
indeed hacked the DNC.
July 2016 Officials announce that the Illinois state online voter registration system is to be shut 
down following a hack.
13 July 2016 
Testimony of Christopher M. E. Painter, Coordinator for Cyber Issues U.S. Department 
of State Before the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform Subcommittees on Information Security and National Security Hearing on 
Digital Acts of War: Evolving the Cybersecurity Conversation.
13 July 2016 DNC intruders leaked selected files exclusively to The Hill, a Washington outlet for 
Congress.
22 July 2016 
After Trump was officially nominated and before the Democratic National Convention 
got under way, WikiLeaks published more than 19,000 DNC emails with more than 
8,000 attachments.
26 July 2016 
PPD–41 Presidential Policy Directive United States Cyber Incident Coordination. 
The directive called for a renewed National Cyber Incident Response Plan that defines 
a nationwide approach to significant cyber incidents, including threat level assessment 
and outlines the roles of both federal and non-federal entities.
29 July 2016 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) server compromise revealed 
in press. DCCC organizes campaign finances.
1 August 2016 Shadow Brokers announces they hacked National Security Agency (NSA) and stole 
cyber weapons which they want to sell at auction.
18 August 2016 FBI issues warning of foreign hackers penetrating voter registration database and state 
election computer systems in Illinois and Arizona.
4–5 September 
2016 
At the G20 Summit Obama urged Vladimir Putin not to let cyberspace become 
the “wild, wild west” and “to cut out” cyber intrusion. Obama called on Russia to 
“act responsibly and start instituting norms” to avoid a Cold War-style escalation, and 
issued warning that America had “more capacity than anybody, both offensively and 
defensively”.
30 September 
2016 
Draft National Cyber Incident Response Plan is out for public discussion, still in need 
of codification.
7 October 2016 
Joint Statement from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence on Election Security designates Russia, saying hacks of 
U.S. political groups and individual politicians could only have been done with 
the authorization of “Russia’s most senior” officials and that its intent was to undermine 
the integrity of the election.
15 October 2016 
Joe Biden said in an interview that the U.S. is ready to hit back to Putin. “He’ll 
know it”, Mr. Biden added. “And it will be at the time of our choosing. And under 
the circumstances that have the greatest impact.”
30 October 2016 The Shadow Brokers claims that the 306 domains and 352 IP addresses revealed in 
the dump belong to the Equation Group.
8 November 
2016 Presidential elections.
10 November 
2016 
 International Law and Stability in Cyberspace. Brian J. Egan, DOS legal adviser 
statement
9 December 2016 
The Washington Post leaked that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had assessed 
that Russia interfered in the election to tilt the election to Trump.
Investigation announced by Obama, POTUS vowed on Friday to “send a clear message 
to Russia” as both a punishment and a deterrent imposing cost.
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16 December 
2016 
Obama explains at the end-of-year news conference the White House perspective on 
how to handle the hacks. He says: “And so in early September, when I saw President 
Putin in China, I felt that the most effective way to ensure that that didn’t happen 
was to talk to him directly and tell him to cut it out, and there were going to be some 
serious consequences if he didn’t. […] But the leaks through WikiLeaks had already 
occurred. […] We allowed law enforcement and the intelligence community to do its 
job without political influence. […] With respect to response, my principal goal leading 
up to the election was making sure that the election itself went off without a hitch, 
that it was not tarnished, and that it did not feed any sense in the public that somehow 
tampering had taken place with the actual process of voting.” 
22 December 
2016 Intelligence Committee releases declassified Snowden Report.
29 December 
2016 
The State Department declared 35 Russian government officials from the Russian 
Embassy in Washington and the Russian Consulate in San Francisco “persona non 
grata”.
Treasury sanctions on individuals for malicious cyber-enabled activities.
Joint Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Statement on Russian 
Malicious Cyber Activity.
The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are 
releasing a Joint Analysis Report (JAR) that contains declassified technical information 
on Russian civilian and military intelligence services’ malicious cyber activity.
The President has approved an amendment to Executive Order 13964.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 approved.
5 January 2017 Directors Clapper and Rogers testified before Congress about the Russian campaign.
6 January 2017 
ODNI Declassified report Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. 
Elections. The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution. The review prepared by 
CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency officials explicitly stated it couldn’t determine 
the effect of the suspected Russian influence campaign on the election process.
12 January 2017 Shadow Brokers tries to sell the hacked cyber weapons again.
Domestic Strategic Environment: Organizational Hindrances of 
Strategic Planning in Cyberspace
Due to the large number of diverse stakeholders involved, cybersecurity policy is like 
a multi-dimensional chess play. The ubiquity and the proprietary nature of the potential 
targets of a cyberattack causes fuzzy scope of jurisdictional responsibilities and policy 
priorities for strategic level cyber defence. The White House is responsible for the security 
and the advancement of vital U.S. interests, thus they should provide political coordination 
and clearly articulated policy guidance at the top of the strategic hierarchy. However, as 
of today, the U.S. does not have a single cybersecurity strategy. Cybersecurity strategy 
formulation is a process overarching several policy areas: national security, homeland 
security and public order. Strategic planning—currently in the phase of risk assessment, 
vulnerability and threat assessment, and strategic concept development—evolves in 
parallel in these different policy areas, as well as at state and local levels in accordance 
with the inherent legal frameworks and institutional culture of each field. Nevertheless, 
the Obama Administration has taken several substantial steps to further develop an 
overarching, coherent and more transparent policy approach built on the preliminary 
cybersecurity measures going back to the 1980s.
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Ends, Ways and Means
In cybersecurity governance the homeland security, law enforcement and national security 
fields are inseparably intertwined. The domestic security authorities are regulated by 
a patchwork of domestic laws which include the Constitution of the United States, federal 
statutes, and self-executing treaties. This legal framework obliges both government 
institutions and private individuals, and regulates the division of labour between 
departments and agencies. According to the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation 
Plan for the Federal Civilian Government: “responsibility for Federal Government 
cybersecurity is distributed and shared by all agencies; however, specific agencies have 
additional roles in supporting this mission and ensuring that the Federal Government has 
the tools, resources, and guidance necessary to make the risk-based decisions necessary 
to secure their systems. FISMA8 states that OMB9 oversees Federal agency information 
security policies and practices. The OMB Cyber and National Security Unit (OMB Cyber) 
was created at the beginning of FY10 2015 to strengthen Federal cybersecurity.” [12: 6]
These are vying for funding with their own distinctive institutional culture. Moreover, 
a unified strategy has to be accepted and approved by governmental entities at lower levels 
too, and also by the private sector. Cybersecurity management to a large extent happens 
at the state level, and any centralization would mean giving up on some of those local 
prerogatives. For example, in February 2017, New York was the first and so far the only U.S. 
state to introduce its own cybersecurity policy with some mandatory regulations. Beyond 
the inherent vulnerability of information technology devices, these proprietary and legislative 
features make cyber security strategy a daunting task, and constitute a constant vulnerability. 
As the Russian influence operation demonstrated, even without any destruction or major 
disruption, significant confusion can be triggered.
Viewed from a strategic lens, the identification of ends, ways and means are far from being 
sorted out. Ends (what to defend) is one of them. The critical infrastructure protection scheme 
emerged in the mid-1990s due to the realization of the growing dependency on information 
infrastructures and the risks thereof. It provides the federal government with overarching 
regulatory authorities in certain vital industries. Twenty years later, basic concepts of 
the scheme are still contentious. In 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation 
Plan for the Federal Civilian Government orders the prioritized identification and protection 
of high value information and assets. In the second part of 2016, the Presidential Commission 
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity was convened to develop policy recommendations 
for the next administration. Accordingly, the commission interrogated critical infrastructure 
owners on what is vital to keep the national economy functioning during a large-scale 
cyberattack. During the Obama era, the linchpin of the process was established in 2013 
via the Executive Order 13636 entitled Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
and Presidential Policy Directive 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience which 
set out steps to strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. 
8 Federal Information Security Management Act.
9 Office of Management and Budget.
10 Financial year.
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PPD–21 re-aligned and updated the HSPD–711 critical infrastructure sectors established in 
2003, and reduced the number from 18 to 16.12 Election and voting systems, though were 
designated as critical infrastructure only after the election hacks in 2016. In addition, it 
is for the first time that critical infrastructure dependency risks are examined in practice. 
A large-scale three-year long research is carried out at the Idaho National Laboratory of 
the Energy Department to map the likely ripple effects and the physical impacts of hacks. 
Similar tests have been initiated to examine how energy sector grid hacks might affect 
military readiness. [13]
Ways (who does what, where, when, how, and why) is especially problematic in 
the domestic cybersecurity environment. As we will see in the next chapter, legislation and 
the White House tend to apply deterrence as an umbrella strategy in an attempt to achieve 
strategic unity. Homeland security—risk management and incident response—and law 
enforcement tools serves as deterrence by denial, and cost imposition. Once these remits are 
decided all the way through, the question of means (resources) also becomes clearer. During 
the 2016 elections, the Democratic National Convention’s servers are owned by the party, 
and the ownership and operation of election machines fall under state autonomy. Even when 
the cyber intrusion was revealed, there was no regulation in place concerning inter-agency 
cooperation and information sharing. Figure 1 serves as an illustration of the fragmented 
cybersecurity decision making authorities at the top-end of the executive branch.
 
WH 
NSC 
DoD DHS DoS DoJ Treasury DoC DoE ODNI 
Figure 1. Politico-strategic cyber security planning at the executive level.13 
[Created by the author.]
11 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection. See: www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7 
12 Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD–21) on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience identifies 16 
critical infrastructure sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, 
defence industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government 
facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear reactors, materials, and waste, 
transportation systems, and water and wastewater systems.
13 Legend: WH = White House; NSC = National Security Council; ODNI = Office of the Director of 
the National Intelligence; DoD = Department of Defense; DoS = Department of State; DHS = Department of 
Homeland Security; DoE = Department of Energy; DoC = Department of Commerce; DoJ = Department of 
Justice.
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First, the underlying dilemma starts at the issue of what are the thresholds for government-
level response. The methodology for assessing the effect of a cyberattack campaign, and 
calculating an unacceptable level of “damage” after which the critical cyberattack threshold 
will be crossed is still evolving. The federal government is primarily responsible for its 
own governmental networks. Beyond that, it takes first-order responsibility for national 
security level threats that constitute a significant cybersecurity incident in the official 
parlance. The notion of a major cybersecurity incident was first determined in a memo for 
the federal agencies by the Office of Management and Budget in 2007. OMB is the largest 
office within the Executive Office of the President, and it issues the Federal Information 
Security Management Act guidance, the key point of reference for homeland security 
planning. The guidance of 2014, based on U.S. CERT National Cyber Incident Scoring 
System defines incident as “an occurrence that (A) actually or imminently jeopardizes, 
without lawful authority, the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of information or an 
information system; or (B) constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of law, 
security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.” An updated version of 
2015 defines a major incident as one that:
• Involves information that is classified or “controlled unclassified information”, 
a broader category that includes proprietary information, intellectual property, trade 
secrets or personally identifiable information.
• Affects at least 10,000 users and is not “recoverable” (for example, sensitive data is 
exfiltrated from agency systems and publicly posted online. Or, the time to recover is 
unpredictable or would require additional resources.)
• Causes an agency to lose the ability to provide a critical service to at least some users. 
A “high-functional” impact, meanwhile, describes an incident in which an agency 
loses the ability to provide all critical services to users.
• Involves the exfiltration, modification, deletion or any other type of unauthorized 
access of information or system. [14]
There are seven levels of severity based on the impact caused and the recoverability 
and dependency of the systems affected. The Obama presidency got one step closer to 
categorizing the national security levels of cyber incidents in the U.S. Cyber Incident 
Coordination presidential directive issued on 26th July 2016. It also uses the same 
terminology and scoring system. Under the directive, all major incidents that is those in 
the top three categories are also considered “significant cyber incidents, meaning they are 
likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or 
economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties or public health and 
safety of the American people. These significant cyber incidents demand unity of effort 
within the Federal Government and especially close coordination between the public 
and private sectors as appropriate.” [15] Another factor seems to influence governmental 
intervention, when the attacker is verifiably a nation state. Obama regularly refers to this 
as a pivotal part of the calculation. In that case, international law kicks in as the regulatory 
norm. The next chapter examines international law considerations.
D. DÉVAI: The U.S. Response to the 2016 Russian Election Meddling… (Part 1)
52 (18) 1 (2019)
Figure 2. Incident scoring in the PPD–41 Presidential Policy Directive  
“United States Cyber Incident Coordination”. [20]
According to these measures, the 2016 Russian hacking meets the standard for a significant 
cyber incident, as there has been demonstrable impact to public confidence and foreign 
relations.
Secondly, it is blurred to what extent cybersecurity is a civilian or a military 
responsibility. Currently, cyberattack response is predominantly a civilian law enforcement, 
counterintelligence and incident response procedure, combined with a (voluntary) regulatory 
framework serving defence and resilience14 purposes. In baseline terms, the Department 
of Homeland Security is responsible for the dot.gov cybersecurity and the public-private 
partnership with critical infrastructure stakeholders. Meanwhile, the information security 
technical expertise in the civilian sector is split between the Department of Homeland Security 
where the US–CERT resides, and the Department of Commerce through the mandate of 
the National Institute of Technology that is authorized to elaborate voluntary cybersecurity 
frameworks.
14 In generic terms resilience is the ability to quickly restore the original shape after an attack. It is an integral 
part of Information and Communication Technology security incident management and homeland security. 
Fast recovery limits potential gains and can convince an opponent not to attack.
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The U.S. Cyber Incident Coordination presidential directive issued on 26th July 2016 
institutionalizes a whole-of-government approach: the directive designates the Department 
of Justice, acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Cyber 
Investigative Joint Task Force, as a lead agency in charge of responding to cyber threats, 
meaning investigation and prosecution, against the United States agencies or companies. 
When cyber incidents occur, the Department of Homeland Security provides assistance to 
potentially impacted entities, analyses the potential impact across critical infrastructure, 
investigates those responsible in conjunction with law enforcement partners, and coordinates 
the national response to significant cyber incidents. [16]
At the level of industry, during a real-world attack on the grid, the Department of Energy 
would be responsible for collecting, evaluating, and sharing information on our energy 
infrastructure, as well as working with Federal, state, and local entities and industry to help 
facilitate the restoration of damaged energy infrastructure. (DARPA is interested specifically 
in an early warning of impending attacks, situation awareness, network isolation and threat 
characterization.)
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assists in aggregating analysis of threat trends, 
and helps “to degrade or mitigate adversary threat capabilities”. [16] The Department of State 
can reach out through diplomatic channels directly to foreign governments where the source 
of the attack is located. In the aftermath of the Sony attack, on 1 April 2015 Obama issued 
an executive order entitled Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant 
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities. The Treasury has the authority to levy sanctions against 
those charged with cyber felony receiving advice from the Department of Commerce and 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
Since the 1980s and increasingly from the early 2000s the FBI, endowed both with 
counterintelligence and law enforcement authorities, has been the lead federal agency for 
investigating cybersecurity incidents. During the Obama Administration, the cybersecurity 
remit of the Department of Justice (DoJ) has been extended considerably. John Carlin 
the head of the DoJ’s National Security Division said the coordinated national security 
investigative and prosecution process and all source intelligence and attribution capability 
within the DoJ is essential, and these are pieces of a new deterrence strategy. Carlin described 
the national security investigations procedure—that was established in reaction to 9/11 
attacks through the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act—that it: “seek to 
harness and coordinate the authorities and capabilities of all members of the national security 
community, state and local law enforcement, and foreign law enforcement and intelligence 
partners, and may result in a wide variety of national security activity, including […] arrest 
and prosecution of perpetrators, imposition of economic sanctions, diplomatic overtures to 
foreign governments, and actions undertaken by U.S. intelligence services or armed forces 
overseas.” [17]
DoJ is responsible for both national security and cyber economic espionage investigations, 
attribution and prosecution. Carlin also linked their task to the globally promoted U.S. 
norms on acceptable behaviour in cyberspace which are enforced by this cross-border law 
enforcement procedure.
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DoD’s Role in Cyber Defence
The public debate about the role of the Department of Defense in national cybersecurity 
has been ongoing for more than a decade. There are signs on the part of the legislative 
and executive authorities to be inclined to delegate more role to the military. Along with 
the extended scope of the DoJ and international norms discussed in the next chapter, 
the military constitutes the other major source of deterrence. When the 2011 DoD Strategy 
for operation in Cyberspace was issued, the DoD was only responsible for the cybersecurity 
of the dot.mil domain. As set by domestic law, the military can only provide assistance 
to domestic civilian authorities in special cases related, for example, to counterterrorism, 
WMD or cybersecurity. DoD has developed and issued key Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities, however, DoD guidance does not clarify the specific roles and responsibilities 
of key DoD entities that may be demanded to support a cyber incident.
There has been a considerable change in the DoD’s role conception after 2012, when in 
August Saudi Aramco was smashed by a massive cyberattack, and later in September several 
Wall Street banks were also hit by a series of DDoS attacks for over a week, and the attacks 
stopped completely only in spring 2013. Since then, a more direct role is articulated for 
the military in critical infrastructure protection. As of today, the military is also involved in 
civilian cybersecurity exercises and also in strategic planning, most notably in the yearly 
Cyber Guard exercises that has shifted from a whole-of-government to a whole-of-nation 
approach. In the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy it is one of the five strategic objectives to “be 
prepared to defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. vital interests from disruptive or destructive 
cyber-attacks of significant consequence”. [18: 14] The Strategy also identifies a role for 
the four groups of mission forces of which the 13 “National Mission Forces and their 
associated support teams will defend the United States and its interests against cyberattacks of 
significant consequence”, thus, they will help defend the nation’s critical infrastructure. [18: 6] 
Unambiguously, the DoD possess the highest level of aggregate cybersecurity expertise both 
in qualitative and quantitative terms. In the U.S., however, there is a statutory restriction, 
the so-called Posse Comitatus Act, concerning the employment of the military force on 
the homeland in peacetime. Rather, it is the National Guards who can operate more freely 
at local levels, and who will have a major role in cyber defence if it is necessitated. Most 
national security strategic documents determine this as the last resort.
In December 2015 the White House Strategy on Cyber Deterrence was delivered. It 
had been commissioned in 2013 by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act, 
with the purpose of outlining how the United States will respond to cyberattacks. It came 
out almost two years late, and between April and December 2015 informally the DoD 
strategy was regarded as a kind of interim national cybersecurity strategy. Another strategic 
ambition running parallel to national cybersecurity is the full integration of cyber capabilities 
into military operations and deterrence. Cyber Command have been boosted to more than 
6,000 troops and cybersecurity budgets, although precise chapters are indiscernible, have 
multiplied. In the military strategic context, designated cyber troops are intensively building 
technical, tactical and C2 operational skills. Rules of Engagement are still in progress, 
and they are largely classified. In 2016, the DoD launched a task force to explore ways, in 
which offensive cyber capabilities could provide support to strategic objectives with results 
to be expected when cyber forces become fully operational. Its mandate is to find ways to 
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operationalize offensive operations: “[T]he role of full-spectrum cyberspace operations in 
supporting shaping, deterrence, constrained military objectives, and full-scale conflict is not 
adequately appreciated or understood. It is the principal objective of this TF to investigate 
the opportunities for, and limitations of, offensive cyber capabilities in support of overall U.S. 
strategy and provide actionable recommendations to enhance those capabilities.” [19: 32]
The Delicate Balance of Public-Private Partnership
Third, the division of labour between the federal government and private sector actors 
in cybersecurity is still unsettled. Both parties are still hesitant about the degree of 
responsibility they are willing and able to take for cybersecurity. The executive branch and 
private sector relationships are entangled but crucial in any sincere cybersecurity efforts. 
One of the first and best known exercises examining the issue of strategic information 
warfare was the 1996 RAND “The Day After” desktop exercise and the following report 
characterizes the federal government’s role as part leadership and part partnership with 
the domestic sector. Similarly, President Obama and leading DHS cybersecurity officials 
emphasize that in private sector cybersecurity the government has only an enabling role, 
providing the private sector with the necessary guidance, early warning and information, 
incident management assistance and incentives to assist in risk management. In the federal 
government’s discourse, cyberspace is an ecosystem with shared responsibilities. As an 
initial overture in 2011, the White House submitted a comprehensive cybersecurity proposal 
to Congress including obligatory cybersecurity standards and voluntary cybersecurity 
practices that could be required to be adopted by critical infrastructure owners, but it was 
rejected as a result of the powerful industrial lobby. It was a stark reminder that progress 
in this area is not just a technical regulatory issue, but rather a tough bargain. Later on, 
the President submitted several regulatory bills, but there has been little change in the basic 
stance of the industry’s voluntary stance.
In 2016, during the Presidential Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity 
hearings, possible further solutions were gauged along the regulatory versus voluntary 
approach and the proactive prevention versus mitigation axles. One enabling policy is 
fostering information sharing between the private sector and public authorities, while 
ensuring liability protection and incentives. Despite several bills, confidence is still lacking 
towards federal agencies. The DNC preventing the FBI from having access to party servers 
is a good example. Extending the DoJ’s investigatory and prosecutorial role was welcome 
by the business community, unlike the White House’s Deterrence Strategy which was 
criticized for ignoring threats below the level of a significant cyber incident. Following in 
the footsteps of the 2013 NSA leak, the 2016 NSA hack and leak revealed exploit kits used 
by NSA to penetrate major IT vendors’ products like Cisco or Fortinet, was another blow to 
the confidence of the private sector towards the government.
The Russian meddling and the increasing number of attacks prove to be a double-edged 
tactic. The distance between public and private actor views and interests seem to diminish. In 
this regard, there has been an important shift in the position of the government on the private 
actors’ right to execute (active) defensive measures, even if not on hack backing back. This 
is a sign of opening up to the idea that the private sector has a major share in cyber power. 
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In May 2015, the Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell announced plans for a guidance 
for industry on cyber defensive actions. Up until now, this has not materialized. The demand 
to legalize forms of self-help for the private industry is increasing. Business leaders and 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce also put growing pressure on the administration to expand 
deterrence to cyber threats that do not rise to the level of warfare, but still cause considerable 
losses.
Conclusion
The article provides a snapshot of the regulatory and institutional environment of the U.S. 
cybersecurity back in 2016. U.S. cybersecurity as a national security issue area emerged 
gradually since the early 1990s, and later on, it was fully elevated to the highest level of 
strategic planning by the Obama presidency. In spite of supposedly having the most powerful 
cyber weapon arsenal, the U.S. strategic advantage in cyberspace is greatly diminished by 
the lack of a coherent and functioning cybersecurity policy. The U.S. is far not alone with 
this deficiency, however, this calls into serious doubt the ability and willingness of the state 
supposedly with the most powerful cyber capabilities.
Among the most serious problems, governance remains disjoint and weak all along 
the statutory, regulatory and enforcement levels. Efficiency would require a shift towards 
centralization and enforcement of regulations at the federal level, but the presidential orders 
and legislative acts do not go beyond the voluntary regulation for the private sector. Cyber 
defence of the federal departments and agencies is also still weak as the Office of Personal 
Management hack shows. On the other hand, there is some progress in the national incident 
response management plan and in the whole-of-the nation cyber exercises. Although there is 
some development towards a bigger role for the military, response mechanism short of war 
remains largely civilian.
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